Gratification Risk and Prevention Strategies in Frontline Administrative Services: Evidence from the Balang Baru Urban Village Office, Makassar City, Indonesia

Authors

  • Anita Reski Amalia Anita Administrasi Pemerintahan Daerah, Institut Teknologi dan Bisnis Maritim Balik Diwa Author
  • Eritrina Eritrina Institut Teknologi dan Bisnis Maritim Balik Diwa image/svg+xml Author
  • Ina Herdiana Pratiwi Institut Teknologi dan Bisnis Maritim Balik Diwa image/svg+xml Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.83835/rj6pz492

Keywords:

gratification, urban village, public service delivery, corruption prevention, good governance

Abstract

Gratuities offered in frontline administrative services remain a persistent corruption risk at the lowest tier of Indonesian urban government. This study examines the risks, drivers, and prevention strategies for gratification in administrative service delivery at the Balang Baru Urban Village (Kelurahan) Office, Tamalate District, Makassar City. The site was selected purposively because eight civil servants serve 18,960 residents at a density of 19,151.52 persons km⁻²; because Makassar City recorded an Integrity Assessment Survey (Survei Penilaian Integritas, SPI) score of 62.3 in 2024, the lowest among Indonesian large cities; and because the incumbent urban village head received an administrative sanction in 2025 for illegal levies in land-document processing. A qualitative literature review was combined with secondary data from official statistics, national integrity surveys, the 2021 Makassar Mayoral Regulation on gratification control, and official statements reported in the media. The data were analysed through Klitgaard's corruption model, the fraud triangle, and the principles of good governance. The analysis indicates that risk arises from ambiguous procedures and fees, information asymmetry, a high service load relative to staffing, reactive oversight, and the normalisation of gifts as expressions of gratitude. Two gaps were identified: an implementation gap between existing regulations and daily practice, and a cultural gap between legal norms and gift-giving customs. Prevention should prioritise transparent service standards, routine reporting through the municipal Gratification Control Unit, service logging and digitalisation, participatory oversight, and accessible complaint channels. The novelty of this study lies in integrating three theoretical frameworks with verified local data. The findings constitute a risk assessment and do not establish that gratification has occurred at the study site.

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2026-11-21

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Gratification Risk and Prevention Strategies in Frontline Administrative Services: Evidence from the Balang Baru Urban Village Office, Makassar City, Indonesia. (2026). Interdisciplinary Policy and Management, 1(3), 109-119. https://doi.org/10.83835/rj6pz492

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